"Some chip companies with foreign design subsidiaries value the opportunity to design on a 24-hour cycle because of the enormous pressure to reach the market ahead of, or no later than, competitors. One established US chip company adopted a rolling cycle between design centers in the United States, Europe, and India. More common is the bi-national arrangement used by a Silicon Valley start-up that had all of its design beyond the initial specification done by a China subsidiary established within months of the company's founding.... The Silicon Valley staff would review Beijing's work from the previous day, then spend up to three hours on the phone (stating around 5 pm California time) providing feedback and reviewing assignments for that day in Beijing. In a single-location firm this work-feedback cycle take two days instead of one." Not only firms, but also consumers prefer to consume services taking advantage of time zone differences. Ireland, pitching to host Europe's main international call centers, offers another example. Cairncross (1997, p. 219) emphasized the rise of the call-center service industry in Ireland, which is taking geographical advantage of being in between the U.S. and Europe.
To summarize above arguments, due to the communications revolution, time zone differences may become a primary driving force behind service trade. Furthermore, these kinds of service trade invite new types of incentives for FDI. From home consumers'/firm's viewpoints, it is preferable that some subsidiaries locate at distant areas to serve for home market. Although this point is at odds with the "proximity advantages" of FDI (e.g., Brainard, 1997) , it seems to be important to consider these new types of FDI incentives.
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The Model
Suppose there are two countries, Home and Foreign, which are endowed with one factor of production (labor). They are located in different time zones and there is no overlap in daily working hours: when Home's daytime working hours end, Foreign daytime working hours begin ( Figure 1 ).
There are two types of goods: a homogeneous good and a large variety of differentiated services. Only Home consumers demand the differentiated services, while both countries' consumers demand the homogeneous good.
The preference of the representative Home consumer are given by
where z is consumption of the homogeneous good, x(v) is consumption of variety v, α = ( − 1)/ , > 1 is an elasticity of substitution between varieties. These preferences imply the following demand function,
where E is the aggregate level of spending in Home, n is the measure of service varieties available in Home, and p(v) is the consumer price of variety v.
The homogeneous good is produced with constant returns, using labor as an input. Units are chosen so that one unit of labor produces one unit of output. As usual, no transport costs exist for the homogeneous good, which serves to tie down the wage rate. Also assume that the parameters of the model are such that both countries produce the homogeneous good; thus, constant, identical wages hold (hereafter set to unity). Now let us turn to the differentiated service sector. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the difference service firms exist only in Home. To enter the industry, a firm bears the fixed costs of entry f E , measured in labor units.
An entrant then draws a labor-per-unit-output coefficient a from a distribution G(a). Upon observing this draw, a firm may decide to exit and not produce. If it choose to produce domestically, however, it bears additional fixed overhead labor costs f D . On the other hand, if it chooses to serve the domestic (Home) market via foreign direct investment (FDI), it bears additional fixed costs f I (e.g., build up communications networks between two countries). We assume
The key assumption is that domestic production requires one workday and that service products are ready for sale after one workday: the delivery of domestic products involves significant costs in terms of delay. In contrast to this, the utilization of communications networks (i.e., FDI) allows production in a foreign country where non-overlapping work hours and trade via networks enable quick delivery and low shipping costs. For these reasons, imported service products whose production benefits from time zone differences provide higher value than domestically produced services.
In order to capture this point, we assume that shipments of products incur the "iceberg" effect of delivery costs: to sell one unit of Foreign products in the Home market, τ units must be shipped. Thus, the price of Foreign services becomes τ times higher than its original price. One can interpret τ as a measure of the inverse of the "delivery timeliness" of Foreign products in the Home market: a lower value of τ implies a quicker delivery.
As mentioned above, domestic production are ready for sale after one workday, whereas imported services whose production benefits from time zone differences are available sooner (see Figure 1) . To parametarize the timing of delivery, we treat the utilization of communications networks (i.e., technological improvement) as a reduction in the delivery time of imported products (i.e., a decrease in τ ). Let us denote the Foreign services' delivery timeliness before technological change as τ 1 and that after change as τ 2 . Then the following condition holds:
Note that this effect comes not from lower production costs in Foreign, but from faster delivery. In other words, in a sense of timeliness, building Foreign subsidiaries via FDI implies building subsidiaries closer to the Home market (see, Figure 1 ).
As noted above, preferences (1) generate a demand function Ap − for every brand of the service products, where the demand level A is exogenous from the point of view of the individual supplier. In this case, the brand of a monopolistic producer with labor coefficient a is offered for sale at the price p = a/α, where 1/α represents the markup factor. As a result, the effective consumer price is a/α for domestically produced services, and is τ i a/α for imported services.
Operating profits from domestic production are
for a firm with a labor-output coefficient a.
On the other hand, the operating profits from FDI (serving Home market via communications network) are
These profit functions are depicted in Figure 2 . In this figure, a 1− is represented on the horizontal axis. Since > 1, this variable increases monotonically with labor productivity 1/a, and can be used as a productivity index.
Two profit functions are increasing linear functions of this index. More productive firms are therefore more profitable in all two activities.
The least productive firms expect negative operating profits and therefore exit the industry. This fate befalls all frims with productivity levels below It is evident from the figure that the cutoff coefficients are determined by
Free entry ensures equality between the expected operating profits of a potential entrant and the entry costs f E . This condition can be expressed as
Equations (9) − (11) provide implicit solutions for the cutoff coefficients a D , a I , and the demand level B.
Combining (9) and (10), the following must be hold:
From (13), we can obtain the ratio of domestic production relative to FDI sales:
Comparative Statics
In order to explore the effects of productivity dispersion on the ratio s D /s I , we parametarize V (a) by parametarizing the distribution G(a). For expositional purposes, let us use a Pareto distribution with the shape parameter k. 3 Then, we can obtain
where c is constant and it is assumed that k > + 1 Plugging back in (14),
we can obtain
It is then straightforward to see that the ratio of domestic production to FDI is decreasing in delivery timeliness of imported services. It also decreasing in productivity dispersion, as parametrized by lower k. 
